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This paper studies the economic role of financial institutions in
economies where agents' incomes are subject to privately observable,
idiosyncratic random events. The information strLlcture precludesconventional
insurance arrangements. However, a financial institution——perhaps bestviewed
as a savings bank——can provide partial insurance by generating atime pattern of
deposit returns that redistributes wealth from agents with high incomesto those
with low incomes, resulting in a level of expected utility higher than that
achievablein simple security markets. Insurance is incomplete because the bank














institutions such as banks,is entering an important third stage of
development. Theoretical models of institutional organization are currently
being developed on a wide variety of fronts1 with a common emphasis on the
importance of private information, incentives and contract enforcement. This
third stage of economic analysis holds out the promise of providing
theoretical explanations of the patterns of institutional structure and
behavior catalogued in the initial stage, the detailed classificatory studies
initiated early in the present century.Further, current theoretical
explanations promise to be more intellectually satisfying and empirically
relevant than earlier second-stage explanations that stressed amorphous
transactions costs.
This paper investigates the nature of financial arrangements in an
environment where individual agents' incomes are subject to idiosyncratic
random shocks.Risk averse individuals desire insurance against such
disturbances, but conventional insurance arrangements are not feasible because
these income fluctuationsare not publicly observed.A financial
institution- -perhaps best visualized as a savings bank- -can provide partial
insurance by generating a time pattern of deposit returns that redistributes
income from agents with high incomes to those with low incomes, resulting in a
level of expected utility for depositors that exceeds other market
alternatives. Our development of this banking theory builds on the earlier
analysis of Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and stresses the similarity of expected
utility maximizing banking arrangements to optimal taxation of saving,
1See,for example, Radner [1981] and Fama-Jensen [1982].2
analogoustodiscusioxis of income taxation by Mirrlees [1971]. As in the
public finance literature, the bank faces a tradeoff between provision of
insurance and maintenance of private incentives. Consequently, insurance is
typically incomplete.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In section
II, we specify the economic environment and individuals' preferences.In
section III, we compare three market institutions: full insurance, autarky and
an ex post security market.The former is not feasible given the
informational requirements of such a system, but serves as a useful "ideal."
An ex post security market dominates autarky, but neither provides insurance
against individual income shocks. In section IV, we discuss the nature of
banking and its provision of partial insurance in our economy, with an
explicit derivation and analysis of the nature of the optimal bank in a
limited (linear) class of candidate institutions.In section V, we analyze
two topics concerning the relationship between deposit banking and ex
security markets: (I) an equivalence between deposit banking and an ex post
market in derivative claims and (ii) potential arbitrage opportunities
occasioned by simultaneous operation of deposit banking and markets in
underlying securities,In section VI, we further consider the insurance
aspects of deposit banking in our model and the types of alterations that
would yield more conventional insurance companies. We also provide a summary
of our work and discussion of related ongoing research in section VII.
II. The Model Economy
The hypothetical economy that we study has three periods: a planning
period (t0) and two periods with production and consumption (tl,2), as in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983).3
Preferences
There are an infinite number of agents, all of whomhave the following
identical valuation of consumption goods in t 1,2.
(1) U =G(u)
1-1/0 1-1 Icc-l 1l-
where u(c1,c2) [c1
+c2 ] andG(u) = u .These
preferences depend on three parameters: the discountfactor 0 << 1;the
intertemporalelasticity of substitution in consumption, 0 >0;andrelative
riskaversion toward random variations in lifetime wealth at known prices,
￿ 0.
Endowments
Each individual has an endowment of the single good in each period.At
periods 0 and 2, all agents have identical endowmentsand y2. At period 1,
each agent receives a privately observable income level y1(8)y1 + 0, where
y1 is thelevel of per capita income at date 1. The idiosyncratic component
of income, 0, has expected value of zero and is continuouslydistributed on
(0,9) with strictly positive density function f(0).As our model has a
continuum of traders, who may be indexed at date 1 by therealized value of 0,
each value of the distribution is realized. That is, there are no'aggregate
shocks' in our model because per capita income is simply y1.
Production Opportunities
In addition to these endowments, agents have intertemporal production
opportunities--storage technologies--of two types.The first type (A)
transforms a unitof goods stored at tinto a unit of goods at t+1.The4
L f c.to±goods stoied at nt >1units in
periodt+2. The B storage technology is illiquid in that no output can be
retrieved from a period t investment at period t+l. Table 1 indicates the









t=l 1 0 -l
t=2 R>l 1
Throughout our discussion, we denote the fraction of initial wealth ()
investedin the process A as k.
Consumption Demand and Lifetime jit
In the bulk of our discussion below, we will view our individualagent as
facing sequential market opportunities with (1) the rate of returnr0 earned
between t=0 and t1; and (ii) the rate of returnr1 earned between t1 and
t=2. Thus, upon realization of 6 at t1, our agent maximizes (1) subject to
the constraint
+ c2/r1 ￿ r0 +
y1(O)+y2/r1a(r0,r1,6).




where h(r1) =[l+r11.] is the first-period propensity to consume out of
wealth.
In these settings, because our agents face uncertainty about "lifetime
wealth," we can separate the effects of attitudes toward risk aversion from
those concerning the time pattern of consumption. That is, once individuals
enter period 1, they face neither uncertain income nor risky assets. Lifetime
utility, but not the consumption strategy, depends on the risk aversion
parameter .Tosee this, recall that lifetime utility has the form
G(u) =u1/(l-fl,where u(c1,c2) is the CES function specified above. The
maximized value of u, which we denote v, is linear in wealth
(4) v u(c,c) (r1)a(r0,r1,0)
where a(r1) =h(r1)1'U0)is the marginal effect of a change in wealth.
Thus, lifetime realized utility--conditional on a value of 0--is
(5) G(v) ---[a(r1)][a(r0,r1,0)],
where (as discussed above) controls the individuals' aversion to bets on
lifetime wealth. For 3 >0,individuals are risk averse.
III.Markets, Insurance and Liquidity
A useful starting point for our analysis is consideration of three
alternative 'trading arrangements' that might arise in our economy.6
C9je
Thecase of complete insurance is a useful benchmark case.In this
benchmarking discussion, we assume that individual incomes/outputs are
publicly observable at zero cost, although this strictly violates the
character of our economic environment as detailed above. Since enforceable
contracts must be contingent on observable variables, public knowledge of
endowments allows standard insurance policies.
As idiosyncratic income (8) has zero mean, each individual should be able
to fully and costlessly insure against 8 at date t0. This insurance is
desirable so long as individuals are risk averse.
With full insurance arranged at date t0, individuals need notengage in
any other market transactions. That is,, they may directly invest in process A
and process B to the points that are efficient given the returns implied by
this technology (r01 and r1R). These investments will yield the consumption
levels shown in Figure 1, wherec1 =h(R)a(l,R,O)and c2 =R[l-h(R)ja(l,R,O),
where the post-insurance value of wealth is just+
y1+y2/Ra(i,R,O).2
Aut arky
The polar extreme to the regime of perfect insurance is autarky, in which
an individual agent cannot make any trades.3 In autarky, our model implies
that agents face two types of uncertainty as a result of 8, which are
illustrated in Figure 2a.For a given value of k, the fraction of wealth
2 In our analysis, here andbelow, we assume that is sufficiently large
relative to y1 andy2 so that market equilibrium takes place "off the
corner" at the aggregate level as shown in Figure 1. That is, individuals
will want to save some portion of .
This might be viewed as the outcome of an explicit restriction on trade or




Equilibrium with 8 Publicly Observable
Note: movements along the budget line reflect variations in k, the fraction




yl ÷y1 Claocat the iud' asset, these are (1) ur i incomearia (ii)
uncertain liquidity.The first of these involves parallel shifts in the
budget line (M] A2) induced by variations in 8. The second of these involves
variation in the position of the vertical segment (LL').
With a historically determined value of k, our individualmay find that a
particular realization of 0 has confronted him with one of twopossible
situations, as illustrated in Figures 2b,c.In Figure 2b, the agent has a
high draw of 0 and 'regrets' that more was not invested inprocess B, as he
faces a return of 1 <Rin his current use of process A. In Figure 2c, the
agent has a low draw of 8 and 'regrets' that so much was invested inprocess
B, as he would like to 'borrow' at the return of 1 reflected by the short-term
process.Efficient selection of k involves trading off these costs and
benefits, which we discuss in detail in Appendix A.We demonstrate two
appealing results, First, in autarky, agents hold more of the liquid asset
than under full information.Second, agents will always hold some of the
illiquid asset (k <1),trading off the consequent possibility of illiquidity
for higher returns (R >1),if initial wealth is sufficiently large.
Ex Post Security Market
In autarky, at date 1, there are some individuals who would liketo sell
part of their investments in technology B (those that have low values of 0
and, hence, are liquidity constrained) and some who would like to buy Units of
B since these offer a superior return to the alternative ofreinvesting in A
(i.e., R >1).We now introduce an ex p security market on which such




Consumption Opportunities in Autarky

















Onthismarket, c1aiisontype B storage may be bought and sold, so that
the strategy of storing at date 0 and selling off at date 1 generates another
'liquid asset' for the agents in this economy. As a convention, let one share
be a claim to a physical unit stored at date 0 and let P denote its price at
date 1.
At date t1, agents have the following budget constraint,
(6) c1+Pqk+P(l-k)+y1+8
in which k is the predetermined fraction invested in the short term asset and
in which q is holdings of the long term asset chosen at t1. Thus,
consumption at t=2 is given by c2 =y2+ Rq. Equivalently, the two period
consumption opportunities are given by
Py2
(7)c1+c2=k+P(l-k)+y1++8.
Solving for a rational expectations equilibrium involves four stages:Ci)
finding an agent's optimal consumption profile, subject to the date 1 budget
constraint, at given P; (ii) finding the P that clears the asset market, given
the supply of long term assets, (l-k); (iii) finding an optimal date 0 choice
of k given that agents know the value of P that will prevail; and (iv)
requiring that date 0 market equilibrium occur. A modest amount of intuition,
however, suggests that our economy will have the following solution: P1 and
where k1 is full information portfolio share discussed above.' That is,
with our CES preference specification, the individual income distribution is
unimportant for the determination of date 1 prices and date U investments.
'Noticethat in equilibrium, individual portfolio choice is indeterminate,
because the strategy of buying a long-term asset at 0 and selling it at
date 1 has the same return as the short term technology. However, market
equilibrium requires that a 'representative agent' hold k1.11
The ex post securities market banishes liquidity risk, as individuals can
trade claims to B storage at P1, as illustrated in Figure 3. However, since
agents are subject to income risk, expected utility E{G[a(R)a(l,R,6)J)is
lower than under the full insurance scheme.
IV. AlternativeBanking Structures
Inthis section, we explore some alternative banking structures that could
arise in the economic environment outlined in section 1 above. One important
object is to develop the welfare implications of alternative arrangements, as
our presumption is that competition produces banks that maximize the expected
utility of the representative consumer.
Throughout our discussion, we imagine banks operating in the following
way. Individuals 'deposit' the initial endowmentat date 0 with the bank,
which will pay an interest rate r0 from period 0 to 1 and r1 from period 1 to
2 on deposits held during these periods.
Conditional on realization of 8, the individual decides on an amount of
funds to be withdrawn from the bank. From our discussion in section II above,









where the second equality follows from (3)above.
For the bank, assets must be structured so as to meet the deterministic
pattern of withdrawals, i.e., investment in the short-term technology so asto





















That is, the bank creates a demand deposit that may be fully withdrawn at date
1.Yet, conditional on the withdrawal behavior w*(r0,r1,0), the bank
structures assets so as to satisfy the demands that will actually materialize
Clearly, (9a,b) restrict the range of feasible deposit returns (r0,r1).
Banking Without Income Insurance
It is possible to interpret the ax post securities market as a deposit
banking institution, which provides a convenient starting point for our
discussion.That is, selecting the deposit rates r01 and r1 =R,it
follows that agents simply accomplish their consumption patterns just as
above, withdrawing more or less depending on 0.These individual withdrawal
fluctuations were represented as security trades in the ax post market.
Thus, this basic banking arrangement has some features that are typically
employed in analysis of banking markets: (i) interest rates on deposits are
equal to the returns on underlying securities over the relevant horizon
(r0 =1and r1 =R)and (ii) individual circumstances cause changes in deposit
balances that are stochastic, but cancel out across depositors.In the
current setup, however, these individual "riskst' involve imply a lower level
of expected utility at date 0 than that obtained in the full insurance case,
so long as individuals are risk averse (G" <0).Thus, other banking
arrangements can potentially dominate this basic structure.14
Inorder foranybankingstructure to improve welfareIn tha
environment,itmust redistribute wealth from the lucky (J >0)to the unlucky
(6<0).The limiting case of such redistribution is, of course, the full
informationredistribution scheme outlined above.A market banking
institution, however, must accomplish such a redistribution subject to
informational constraints, i.e., the private character of idiosyncratic
income, 6.Consequently,a tension arises between redistribution and
individual incentives that is analagous to the tradeoffs in the analysis of
principal-agent problems (e.g., Ross [1973]) and optimal income taxation (as
initially investigated by iirrlees [1971] and with a good overview provided by
Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980, sections 13-3,4]).
Deposit Rates and Income Insurance
By raising the interest rate r0 and loweringr1, the bank can induce a
redistribution from agents with higher incomes to those with lower incomes.
We begin by considering a small increase inr0 and a small decrease in r1.
The bank, of course, must respect its budget constraint, which is obtained





















-Ec)/r.Since Ec >y2,it follows that a small increase
in r0 requires a decrease in
r1.15











The form of this expression reflects that increases inr0 have an identical
wealth effect on all consumers, where a is the marginal benefit (in u units)
of a unit of period 1 wealth. As discussed above, a is invariant to 0 in our
CES example. By contrast, the wealth effect of an increase inr1 is largest
for individuals who are the greatest lenders in period 1, i.e., for those whom
<<c(0).Imposing the condition that dr0 and dr1 be feasible and






With risk aversion, G" <0,the covariance term is unambiguosly negative, so
that a small decline inr1 raises welfare. Intuitively, by- raising r0 and
lowering r1, the bank has shifted wealth from those with high 0's to the
average individual.In effect, at date 0, the bank offers an individual
security that has a certain date 1 expected return (dr0) and pays off
negatively when high 0's occur, so reducing individual risks.
Valuing Fractional Insurance
The extent of the demand for insurance in our economy is best measured by
the price that individuals would pay for artificial assets with individual-
specific returns. That is, for any individual at date 0. wealth is a random
variable a(r0,r1,0) because of the idiosyncratic component of individual:;o, Extd uliyE{&[( )ri,G)j(rwas defined
above.
Now, iiineconstructingthe artificial asset that has date 1"returi
thatare afunction of ,x(e)with Ex(8).= 1.Our individual would have
expected utility unchanged if an infinitesimalamount of this claim was traded
for units of output in period 1 if
(13) E(G'}p -E{G'x(O))=0.
Equivalently, the price must be less thanunity if the covariance of x(8) with





Thatis, our agent would 'price' such an assetby principles that accord with
the theory of finance (Fama andMiller, [1972]) and,inparticular, with
recent theories that stress covariance withmarginal utility of lifetime
wealth, (Breeden [1979] and Grossman-Shjl].er[1982]).In our context,
however, the private character of informationand absence of aggreate shocks
implies that (1) risk arises from the
idiosyncratic disturbance, 8, and(ii)
that no securities with these directcharacteristics could be tradedon
markets.
The2pmal Linear Bank
The tradeoff between insurance andincentives emerges when one considers
changes in r0 andr1 that are not small.But the principal economic
institutionbehind the previous local resultsextends to the optimal linear17
banking structure, which we derive in Appendix B.In particular, the optimal
level of r1 satisfies
(15) r1 R[2 +62a]/[c2 + + R62]
=RZ(t2,2T
The determinants of this optimal level of r1 are as follows. First, there is
a measure of intertemporal substitution, specifically £2 is the compensated
semi-elasticity of second period consumption demand with respect to its price,
3c*
p hr .Thatis, £= - >0.Second, is the effect 2 1 2 c2 p2u
of a wealth increment on second period consumption. Third, 62 is the extent
of the 'risk premium' imposed by a representative private agent on a bet of
the form c(O)/Ec(8), which has expected return of one but covaries
negatively with lifetime marginal utility,
-{cov(G',c(O))/EG'Ec(O)} >0.
Initially, note that r1 <Rso long as agents are risk averse (62 >0),
which preserves the flavor of the local results above. Further, the higher
the risk premium ó2 the lower the level of r1, i.e., az/a62 <0.This
accords with the idea, developed above, thatit is a demand for
insurance--reflected in -that motivates decreases in r1 and consequent
increases in r0. Two further elements enter the formula that were not present
above: higher values of second consumption response to the interest rate or to
wealth raise the efficient value of r1, i.e, z/32 >0and z/(}E_) >0.
These additional effects can readily be explained by returning to the bank's
feasibility condition and exploring the effects of changes in r0 and r1 laid
out in (15) above. The bank receives a return R on funds held over from t1t t2, but must payoutonly r1, yielding a 'surplus' that can be distributd
as initial returns
r0.The extent of this surplus can be illustratedby




wherethe right-hand side is the surplus.Now,- as there is a higher
substitution response (E2)insecond period consumption, changes inr1 erode
the deposit 'base' [r0 -Ew"(r0,r1,O)}more rapidly. Thus, the bank picks a
higher value of r1. Furthermore, wealthinduced changes inconsumption enter
via r0 because an increase inr0 raises wealth and, hence, second period
ac3c
consumption by the amount -i-----—i— . Witha large -i--—,consumers
0
spend most of the wealth increase in period 2, initially saving it. Because
the bank receives R on these deposits, the "surplus" hasincreased.
Conversely,, a low implies consumers withdraw much of the wealth,
leaving the bank with a small deposit base and little surplus, ableto pay
only a low r1.
In fact, this idea of deposit base erosion bringsus naturally to
discussion of a constraint not explicitly imposed in derivationof formula
(15) above. That is, in order for the income redistribution towork, it is
necessary that r1 ￿ 1, so that depositors do not have an incentive to withdraw
at date tl so as to invest in technology A from period t1 to t2.
Figure 4 illustrates the effects of banking on the welfare andconsumption
levels of an 'average' agent, i.e., one with 00. The budget constraint
facing this agent reflects the fact thatr1 <Runder deposit banking and
induces a substitution from consumption in period 2 toperiod 1. The 'tax on19
saving' that the banking system• imposes lowers the welfare of this average
agent, since his consumption must fundamentally be constrained by the (per
capita) nature of social opportunities. Although the welfare of the 'average'
agent depicted in Figure 4 declines, the expected utility of agents (prior to
the realization of 0) is increased by deposit banking, because of a reduction
in the range of variability of individual circumstances.
Nonlinear Schedules and Ex Post Arbitrage
A priori, nothing restricts the bank to a linear pay-off schedule.
Indeed, throughout our discussion, we have employed the analogy between
deposit banking and distributive taxation: Mirrlees [1971] and others have
explored non-linear tax structures in some detail.
Although we have so far not made it explicit in our discussion and in
particular have not formally incorporated this constraint into Appendix B, we
assume that ex post arbitrage by groups of depositors would rule out any bank
contracts that made the interest rates r0 and r1 functions of withdrawal
amounts.That is, even if depositors were limited to one withdrawal per
period, then nonlinearities in the bank schedules would make coalition
formation feasible and desirable.
V.Deposit Banking and Ex Post Security Markets
Thepurpose of this section is to clarify several aspects of the
relationship between the deposit banking arrangements outlined previously and
ex post security markets.C2
B'
Figure 4
An Average Agent Under Simple and Linear BankingSystems
MM' isc1 +R'c2y1 +R'y2
+







1arkets in Derivative Claims
The deposit banking institution discussed above utilized no resources but
was a pure intermediary, purchasing one set of claims and issuing another.
This observation suggests that similar insurance could be delivered by a
particular type of financial instrument without the demand deposit
characteristic.
That is, suppose that at date 0 individuals can only purchase shares on a
"fund" that combines kB units of the short-term asset and (i_kB) units of the
long-term asset, where kB is the amounted invested by the optimal linear bank
discussed in the preceeding section. To make this conform as closely to our
previous discussion, let the "fund" announce that its policy will be to pay
share-holders interest equal to per share at date 1 and use the
remainder of its income to repurchase its shares at the going market price
Let the amount of this repurchase in shares beso that (r0-i)i +k.
Further, let the fund announce that it will pay shareholders r1 (principal
plus interest) at date 2 with its available funds r1(-ii) (KB)L Now,
suppose that the market price is one and that=[Ew(r0,r1,6)-(r0-i))
is the announced repurchase amount. Then, it is direct that the levels of
bank rates r0,r1 are feasible from the perspective of the "fund". Further,
=1is a rational expectations equilibrium price in the market for "fund"
shares since supply and demand for "fund" shares will be equated at that
price.
Noticethat the "fund" does not have a policy of "pegging" the price of
itsshares at one, which is one interpretation of the bank's policy in section
IVabove.Similarly, it is commonly observed that banks have date 122
liabilities [(1+r0)} that exceed their date 1cash flows [kB], which is
sometimes asserted to lead to bankinginstability. The "fund" described above
should not have such a problem.
The fact that a market in thistype of derivative security can replicate
the allocations of the optimal linear bank hasimportant consequences for the
analysis of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). These authorssuggest that the demand
characteristic is a necessary outcome ofenvironments where individuals
circumstances are subject to privately observablerandom shocks.5 They go on
to argue that banking runs--viewed asself-fulfilling expectations that all
agents will demand funds in period 1--are aconsequent potential outcome of
this sort of environment.The ex p market in the derivativesecurity
outlined above would not be susceptible toruns and thus would dominate the
sort of bank deposit scheme considered by Diamond andDybvig (1983).
Derivative Claims and Ex Ante Incentives
Throughout the preceeding discussion, we confronted individualagents with
extreme choices of date 0: remain in autarky orpurchase claims at date 0 from
the bank (by depositing one's funds) or from the "fund"Now, we want to
imagine a single agent pursuing the followingstrategy: (i) at date 0, invest
a unit (part of flinthe long-term asset and (ii) at date 1, sell thisto a
depositor from the bank at a price that the depositorwill find yields a
higher return than the bank deposit, i.e.,p R/r1 -, forsome c >0.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) consider a two statemodel with preference shocks
and a slightly different technology (see fn 6below) but these differences
are inessential for the present discussion.23
Is this strategy profitable from the stand-point of our agent? The answer
turns on whether the rate of return from 0 to 1 exceeds the bank deposit rate
r0. That is, we want toknow whether p >r
for some>0.To discuss
this, we need to return to the bank's budget constraint in present value form,





This may be rewritten as
R/r1 -r0
=
wherethe right-hand term is positive for our bank asr0 >1and
Ew*(r0,r1,O) <•.Thus, it is possible to construct a price p that satisfies
<p<R/r1
for any 0 <t < (r0-l)/(-Ew),with the choice ofreflecting the division
of the gains from trade between the two agents.
Thus, there are incentives for individual agents to Ci)notjoin the bank
if others do and to (ii) induce bank members to withdraw balances to finance
asset accumulation rather than consumption. Basically, this result ref lects
the fact that the bank is engaged in insurance (redistribution) so that its
returns do not correspond to those given by the technology (in particular, the
return Similar ex ante arbitrage opportunities (i.e., based on
decisions at date 0) would also occur in the "fund" case discussed above. The
incentives for individuals to avoid joining the bank in period 0 mean that
without binding contracts, the bank would not arise. This points out the
importance of refining the equilibrium concept employed in our analysis, a
subject which is on our agenda for further research.24
V. Comparisons of Alternative Structures
Inautarky, each individual agent is subject to twotypes of private risks
stemming from individual income fluctuations(0): (1)pureincome risk and
(ii) illiquidity risk, which arise from theinteraction of the information
technology (the private character of 0) and the
production technology (process
B is irreversible).
Ex security markets remove the illiquidity risk from
fluctuating
individual circumstances (9) byenabling agents to sell claims against the
returns from long term investmentprojects.Consequently, in our setup, ex
p security markets dominate autarky,according to the expected utility
(pareto) criterion at date 0.6Equivalently,a simple banking arrangement,
could provide the necessary tpooling' ofliquidity risks, as it replicates the
ex p security market. Such possibilities forpooling of liquidity risks
induce agents to invest more inlong-term projects than they would under
autarky.
The optimal linear banking structureprovides agents with a higher level
of expected utility than sucha. simple banking structure or an ex
security market, however, as it partially insuresagents against income risks
as well as fully against liquidity risks.The provision of insurance is
typically incomplete because the bank faces a tradeoffbetween insurance and
6 This result
contrasts to Diamond-Dybvig [1983], who showan equivalence between autarky and exp security markets, in a model where agents are
subject to individual (privately observable)preference shocks.If our
technology B is modified to be partly reversible, withpayoffs (1-b) at t1 and R at t=2, then ex post security marketswill dominate autarky so long as b > 0, i.e., there is a positiveopportunity cost to investing in B rather than A. If b=0, the onlytechnology B will be employed and agents
will face no ttiliiquidity risks" inautarky.Thus, there will be an
equivalence of autarky and ex p security marketsas only pure income risks will be relevant in each case.Further, no trade will occur on these
ex post markets.25
incentives for saving. Relative to ex post security markets, banks offer
higher short term yields (r0>l) and lower long term yields (r1<R). The
banking-insurance mechanism induces substitutions that imply that more
investment will take place in projects of shorter duration. Without income
uncertainty (if 620), an optimal bank would set r0 =1and r1 =R,thus
serving no economic purpose.
In viewing an economic role of banking as providing insurance against
unobservable private risks, it is useful to consider two related insurance
concepts. First, in environments where there are substantial idiosyncratic
private risks, borrowing and lending can serve as 'buffer' that permits long-
lived individuals to smooth consumption and, hence, reduce the risks of
individual shocks. However, this insurance role of saving is bounded as long
as agents have finite lives or are sufficiently impatient.7 Thus, we expect
that our results would be robust to extensions to more time periods. Second,
it is natural to ask why one sees both cooperative institutions such as
savings banks and companies providing traditional insurance. We believe that
traditional insurance typically arises when individual circumstances can be
verified but not costlessly.(Townsend, [1979].) Consequently, equilibrium
insurance contracts involve 'deductability,' i.e., the decision by the insured
agent that particular events are not sufficiently costly to warrant payment of
verification costs. By contrast, the insurance provided by our 'savings bank'
scheme does not require state verification. Thus, these institutions coexist
because there are many types of idiosyncratic risks, with varying costs of
state verification.
Grossman and Weiss [1982] suggest that the bond market can provide perfect
insurance, but a careful reading of their discussion makes clear that
incomes must be observable to obtain such a result.26
VI.Summary and Conclusions
Inthis paper, we have discussed how a private financial institution--such
as a savings bank--can provide partial insurance against fluctuations in
individual incomes that are private information. In our model, fluctuations
in individual incomes cause income and illiquidity risks in autarky. Lx
security markets or simple banking structures that are pure intermediaries can
remove illiquidity risks, but insurance against income fluctuations requires
that bank deposit returns differ from those on individual securities.
Insurance is partial because the cooperative banking institution facesa
tradeoff between insurance and (intertemporal) allocative efficiency.
As macroeconomists, our principal interest in this framework is to havea
secure foundation for aggregate analysis and, consequently, several comments
are in order.First, our formal model is the standard sort that most
macroeconomists have in mind when concerned with tmicro structure?: allagents
have identical preferences that can be aggregated, but individualagents
differ due to fluctuations in individual conditions thataverage out across
individuals (see, for example, Friedman [l969]), Yet, risk aversion and the
private character of individual income fluctuations, however, imply that
banking institutions of the sort discussed in section IV dominate conventional
market structures. Second, one might conjecture thatresponses to aggregate
disturbances--such as shifts in per capita incomes(y1,y2) or rates of return
(R) in our framework- -would be unaffected by the institutionalstructure,
since no risk pooling can occur against these shocks. But, in extensions to
our analysis, such an invariance to micro structure requires thataggregate
disturbances not be associated with changes in the dispersion of individual
8Thetrivial aggregation makes it easy for us to analyze ex p!tsecurity
markets, etc.27
income fluctuations. In fact, Haubrich [1983] demonstrates that the existence
of banks alters the temporal structure of equilibrium interest rates and
consumption-investment quantitiesif there are effects of aggregate
disturbances on the income distribution.Consequently, taking these two
observations together, explicit analysis of factors that lead to development
of specific institutional structures--such as private information--may also
alter our conclusions about aggregate responses.28
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Appendix A
PortfolioComposition and Consumption in Autarky
We discuss optimal decisions of the autarkic individual using the typical
dynamic programming method of recursive optimization..
Decisions at Date.1
At date 1, our individual's portfolio composition (k) is predetermined.
The agent maximizes utility G(u) subject to the following two constraints:
(Al) c1 ￿ y1 +6+k L(8,k)
(A2) c1 +c2￿ y2 +(l-k)R+(k+y1+6)
EA(6,k).
The former of these constraints is the liquidity constraint. It does not bind
an agent if c1h(l)A(O,k) ￿ L(O,k).With the liquidity constraint not
binding, an agent has indirect utility vNB(O,k) =a(l)A(6,k).
Correspondingly, with the liquidity constrint binding, an agent has indirect
utility vB(O,k) [Ll +(A_L)l']0.In Figure A-i, we graph the
indirect utility function against 0. Notice that v is not linear in current
income, 6, when the constraint is binding, i.e., when 6 <Uc -y1
-
andthat agents have a higher marginal utility of 6 over this range.
Decisions at Date 0
At date 0, the autarchic individual selects k so as to maximize expected





The marginal expected utility of investment in the liquid asset is (A4). For




From Figure A-i, we know that vB(O) =vNB(O),so that the first and third
terms just cancel.
Efficient Investment in the Liquid Asset
First, we demonstrate that an individual will subject himself to some
illiquidity risk in autarky, providing--as assumed in the main text--that
wealth is sufficiently large. Specifically, we require that if income is at








since R >1.This is a variant of Arrow's famous proposition [1964] that a
risk averse agent will always accept a small amount of a bet with positive
expected return.31
Second, we want to demonstrate that an individual will holdmore of the
liquid asset in autarky than with an ex postsecurity market. Consider the
value kE that is efficient in an exp security market. This satisfies
(A7)IG(vNB(O,K))Jf(e)de =0.
Now, consider the crossover value0E implied by kE. Above 0E agents are
equally well off in autarky and in an ex post security market. EvaluateCM)




The utility derived from a marginal increment ofinvestment in the liquid
asset is always higher with the constraint binding for tworeasons: Ci) as may
be seen from Figure A-i, the level of unconstrained "u unit"Utility (vB) lies
above the constrained level(vNB) and the strict concavity of G insures that
G' is diminishing in v; and (ii) themarginal "Uunit"utility obtained from a
unitofperiod are resources is higher when the constraint is binding,i.e.,
vB/ak >avNB/ak.Thus, it follows that EU/k is negative at
kE.It is
tedious but straightforward to show that CA3) isstrictly concave in k, so
that the efficient proportion of investment in theliquid asset under autarky
(kA) must be greater than kE.Figure A-i







In this appendix, we present a detailed treatment of an optimal linear
banking structure or, equivalently, an optimal linear tax on saving.
An individual private agent, with given value of period 1 income, chooses
an optimal consumption plan so as to maximize utility.
(Bl) max u(c1,c2) subject to c1 + p2 c2 ￿ T + y1(8) + p2 y2
cl,c2
—1 where p2 =(r1)and T =
indirectutility function,
c(8,p2,T) and 4(6,p2,T).









outcome of this maximization is an
and a set of optimal decisions
not the same functions as those
move
In the CES case, u(c1,c2) =[cl/+ and the relevant
value function and decision rules are given by
* -l




p2[l-h(p2 )][y1(8) + T + p2 y2]
(B2c) V =a(p21)[y1(8)
+ T + p2 y2].
where h(p ) =[1+ a-(a-l)_l and a(p ) =h(p21)l /l- is
independent of 8.Further, we record for future use that the compensated
semi-elasticity
(B3)
is independent of the scale of wealth, i.e., [y1(O) + T + p2 y2].
The implied withdrawal behavior of an individual is w(8) =34
c(8) -y1(8).Thus, it follows that w*(U,p2,T) =h(p21)(p2y2 +T)
-
(l-h(p2))y1(O).
Prior to the realization of U, in period 0, an expected utility maximizing
bank or government will maximize
(B4) E{G(v(O,p2,T))}
with respect to p2 =r11and T =r0subject to (1) a resource constraint
and (ii) the depositor's decision rules, c(8), c(8), and w(8). The basic
resource constraints for a bank are
(B5a) k =Ew*(O,p2,T)
(B5b) R(l-k)E[r1(r0 Ew(U,p2,T))]













Forming the 'Lagrangian' for this problem,




and differentiating with respect to T andp2. we get the following necessary




A(p2-R1)(E -i = 035
aEc* (B9b) -= - A(y-Ec*)+ "p -R)
2=
p2 p2 p2
The first of these conditionsmay be reorganized as
(BlO) .E{b(8)} =1
ac*




c2(6,p2,T)) and the Slutzky decomposition
3c ac ac =— 2
-c)+
it follows that the second conditionmay be written as
* -l3c (Bil) EC(b(8)-l)(y2 -c2)}÷ -R)E{1—I} =0
These conditions correspond to those of Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980, pp.
407-8] in the optimal linear income taxcase, who provide the relevant
interpretations in that setting.
Solving the second necessary condition, andsimplifying slightly, we find
*





Inour framework, some further reorganization ofthis condition is useful. As
a, a4/aT and £2 are independent of 0, wemay write this as
*
-l -cov(G ,c2)aEG' 1 (B13) p2 -R=
EG'Ec
eEC' = —)
where is the individual's implicit riskpremium on the ficticious security,
a c*
which has a unit mean, and£2 = which36
is the compensated semi-elasticity of second period consumption with respect
to its price p2 =r
.Furthersimplification may be obtained by noting
8





Theformula discussed in the text is a straightforward transformation of this
expression.